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Dilution or Delusion:
A Bias in the Common
Stock Equivalence Test
By Lola Woodard Dudley

Abstract
This study of the effect of convertible bonds on 133
primary earnings per share computations found that,
contrary to expectations, non-common stock equivalents
are more likely to be dilutive than common stock equiva
lents. If the FASB is unwilling to discard the common
stock equivalence test, perhaps it should consider revers
ing it; that is, including non-common stock equivalents in
primary earnings per share and excluding common stock
equivalents.
Introduction
According to the requirements of APB 15, firms which
have potentially dilutive securities in their capital struc
ture must present two earnings per share figures, primary
and fully diluted. Primary earnings per share includes
both common shares actually outstanding and common
stock equivalents. Fully diluted earnings per share
includes all securities which would decrease earnings per
share if converted or exercised, whether they are com
mon stock equivalents or not. Equivalence is determined
by the “common stock equivalence test.” Under this test,
convertibles are common stock equivalents if, at issuance,
their effective yield is less than two-thirds of the Aa
corporate bond rate (APB 15; FASB 55; FASB 85).
Although primary earnings per share and fully diluted
earnings per share are given equal prominence on the
financial statements, primary earnings per share is
generally considered to be the more important of the two
(Boyer and Gibson, 1979). Financial services, such as
Moody’s and Value Line, report only primary earnings per
share, and users of financial statements tend to focus on
primary earnings per share. This is understandable in
light of the APB’s statement that common stock equiva
lents are included because they are common stock in
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substance, although not in form (APB 15, para.25). The
implication is that primary earnings per share includes
those securities which are more like common stock in
substance than are other dilutive securities. This has
generally been interpreted to mean that common stock
equivalents are more likely to be converted or that their
conversion is more imminent than non-common stock
equivalents (Frank and Weygandt, 1970). Accordingly,
primary earnings per share should be more predictive of
future earnings per share and more useful for investment
and credit decisions.
Studies (Frank and Weygandt, 1970; Hofstedt and West,
1971; Fulmer and Moon, 1984; Dudley, 1986) have shown,
however, that the common stock equivalence test does not
accurately predict conversion of convertible bonds. These
studies found that common stock equivalents were no
more likely to be converted than non-common stock
equivalents. They also indicate that the common stock
equivalence test is biased against common stock equiva
lence; that is, the test is structured so that convertible
securities are unlikely to pass the test.
Other research (Sterner, 1983; Dudley, 1985, 1986) has
suggested that the lack of predictive ability and bias in the
common stock equivalence test could cause primary
earnings per share to be misleading and of doubtful
usefulness in assessing the effects of potentially dilutive
securities on earnings per share.
These shortcoming in primary earnings per share have
led many to propose discontinuance of primary earnings
per share and reporting of simple earnings per share
along with fully diluted earnings per share. Others have
argued for replacing the present common stock equiva
lence test with a more useful one. Studies have shown that
a test based on a bond’s conversion value/call price ratio
(Frank and Weygandt, 1971) or on its market price/

Figure 1
Common Stock Equivalence and Dilution
Materiality = 3%

conversion value ratio (Arnold and
Humann, 1973) would be preferable.
Use of the option pricing model also
might improve earnings per share
reporting (King, 1984). While
primary earnings per share reporting
has been strongly criticized and
alternatives to it have been sug
gested, no previous work has deter
mined the actual effect of problems
with the common stock equivalence
test on the reporting of earnings per
share.

Since financial statement
users rely heavily on
primary earnings per
share, these distortions
can be very damaging.
This paper reports on the distor
tions in primary earnings per share
caused by the common stock equiva
lence test for a group of firms with
outstanding convertible bonds. Since

financial statement users rely heavily
on primary earnings per share, these
distortions can be very damaging.
The fact two earnings per share
figures are reported does not lessen
the damage because apparently fully
diluted earnings per share is largely
ignored (Boyer and Gibson, 1979).
Methodology
To analyze the effect of a common
stock equivalence test on primary
earnings per share, a study was done
on 82 convertible bonds listed in
Moody’s Bond Survey as issued
during the years 1976-1980. The
length of this period ensured that
sufficient time had elapsed since
issuance to permit substantial
conversion to take place.
The first step in the analysis was
the determination of common stock
equivalence for each security, as
specified by FASB 85. Each security
was then traced until January 1,1988,
to determine the amount of conver
sion that had taken place. The data to
make this determination were
obtained from Moody’s Bond Record,

Moody’s Manuals, and the Wall
Street Journal.
For all firms with 100% converted
securities, two earnings per share
figures were calculated for each year
the bonds were outstanding. A
“simple earnings per share” figure,
based on reported net income and
common shares outstanding, was
found for each year the bonds were
outstanding. Next, a “diluted earn
ings per share” figure was calculated
based on the assumption that the
bonds were converted at the begin
ning of the year (or at issuance if
later).
These calculations followed the “if
converted” procedure outlined in
APB 15 whereby the interest on
convertible bonds, net of tax, is
added to the firm’s net income and
the number of shares the bonds are
convertible into is added to actual
common shares outstanding. Ad
justed net income is then divided by
adjusted shares to arrive at “diluted
earnings per share.”
For common stock equivalents, the
primary earnings per share figure
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reported in the income statement
would be diluted earnings per share.
For non-common stock equivalents,
primary earnings per share would be
equal to simple earnings per share.
Differences between the pairs of
simple earnings per share and
diluted earnings per share figures
were analyzed for disparities between
common stock equivalents and non
common stock equivalents.
Data Analysis
By January 1, 1988, 44 (54%) of the
82 bond issues had been completely
converted. All 44 issues, therefore,
eventually would have diluted
earnings per share. For the 12 firms
whose bonds were commons stock
equivalents, primary earnings per
share would be equal to diluted
earnings per share. Primary earn
ings per share for the 32 firms with
non-common stock equivalents,
however, would be simple earnings
per share. While the non-common
stock equivalent issues were out
standing, 96 primary earnings per
share figures would have been

reported for these firms, figures
excluding the dilutive effects of the
non-common stock equivalent bonds.
Of the 96 figures, 84 would have been
reduced had the dilutive effect of the
bonds been included; this eventual
dilution of earnings per share was
not reflected in primary earnings per
share in 87.5% of the cases.

Dilution and Common
Stock Equivalence
Is there a valid reason for making
this distinction between common
stock equivalents and non-common
stock equivalents? Common stock
equivalents are no more likely to be
converted than non-common stock
equivalents, but the test could still be
useful if the differences between
simple earnings per share and
diluted earnings per share were
greater for common stock equiva
lents than for non-common stock
equivalents. In order to analyze this,
the 133 pairs of earnings per share
figures (37 for commons stock
equivalents, 96 for non-common
stock equivalents) were examined

using the T-Test for Paired Observa
tions. For non-common stock equiva
lents, the differences (mean = 6.2%)
were statistically significant (.05
level); for common stock equivalents,
however, the differences (mean =
4.0%) were not significant. (The
Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test yielded
the same result.) This suggests that
common stock equivalents are no
more dilutive than non-common
stock equivalents; in fact, they
actually may be less dilutive.
Are common stock equivalents
more likely to be materially dilutive
than non-common stock equivalents?
The observations were classified as
“materially dilutive” (3% or more) or
“not materially dilutive” (less than
3%), as defined by the FASB (Figure
1). The non-common stock equiva
lents were materially dilutive more
often than the common stock equiva
lents. While these differences were
not statistically significant, using the
Chi-Square Independence of Classifi
cation Test at the .05 level of signifi
cance, they indicated that the
common stock equivalence test may

Figure 2
Common Stock Equivalence and Dilution
Materiality = 4%
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result in the inelusion of the least
dilutive securities in primary earn
ings per share and the exclusion of
the most dilutive ones.
These findings raised questions
about the relevance of the FASB’s 3%
threshold for materiality. This
threshold appears to be completely
arbitrary, with no practical or theo
retical basis provided to support this
particular cutoff point. When the
definition of materiality was changed
to dilution of 4% or more, the results
were startling (Figure 2). The non
common stock equivalents were
significantly (.05 level) more likely to
be materially dilutive than the
common stock equivalents. Using 5%
and 10% thresholds for materiality
provided the same results as those
obtained from a 4% cutoff.

Conclusions
Even if common and non-common
stock equivalents were equally
dilutive, the common stock equiva
lence test still would tend to overstate
primary earnings per share because
convertible bonds are likely to fail
the test; therefore, their dilutive
effect is not included in primary
earnings per share. This is sufficient
to warrant discontinuance of the
common stock equivalence test as
useless. The potential for distortion,
however, makes the test worse than
useless.
The non-common stock equiva
lents were actually more dilutive than
the common stock equivalents and,
when a 4% materiality threshold was
used, non-common stock equivalents
were significantly more likely to be
materially dilutive than were com
mon stock equivalents. Therefore,
the common stock equivalence test is
excluding the most dilutive securities
from primary earnings per share,
while including the least dilutive
ones. To call this simply useless is
inadequate; these figures are, in fact,
completely contrary to expectations,
misleading, and possibly injurious to
financial statement users.
Primary earnings per share
computations are extremely complex
and, one would assume, costly to
perform; yet, the resulting figures
are of no benefit to users of financial
statements. Considering the criti-

This FASB has been
advised to discard the
common stock equivalence
test or replace it with a
more useful test many
times before, however,
and it has shown no
inclination to do either.
cisms that are leveled against the
FASB for requiring costly procedures
that do not enhance the usefulness of
financial statements (Berton, 1989),
the Board should not continue to
ignore the problems inherent in the
common stock equivalence test.
The FASB could have firms report
only simple earnings per share and
fully diluted earnings per share. If
additional information were pre
sented about convertible bonds
issues, users could draw their own
conclusions about common stock
equivalence and compute a “primary
earnings per share” for themselves, if
desired.
Another possibility would be for
the FASB to replace the present
common stock equivalence test with
a more useful one, such as a bond’s
conversion value/call price ratio or
on its market price/conversion value
ratio. The option pricing model also
has the potential for improving the
reporting of earnings per share.
While its application to earnings per
share has not been fully developed, a
recent study (King, 1984) suggests
that it, too, could improve reporting
in this area.
This FASB has been advised to
discard the common stock equiva
lence test or replace it with a more
useful test many times before,
however, and it has shown no
inclination to do either. In light of the
findings of this study, perhaps the
Board should consider reversing the
test. That is, those securities that
meet the common stock equivalence
test should be excluded from pri
mary earnings per share and those
that fail it should be included. While
this would not improve the relation
ship between common stock equiva
lence and eventual conversion, at

least primary earnings per share
would be more likely to include the
most dilutive securities than does the
current method.
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